Part 4: Alternatives to Closing the High Seas – Potential Strategies and Outcomes

“In my view, we have to somehow carve up the ocean into three categories: (1) Areas “owned” by countries (EEZs), (2) Areas not “owned” by anybody, and with no legally binding governance (basically the current situation on the HS), and (3) Areas closed to fishing (we don’t really have these outside of EEZs),” says Costello. “To me, an interesting question is whether we should have *any* of category 2. I can think of some equity-based arguments, but I’m not sure they would stand up to scrutiny.”

“Basically the tradeoff is: In open access, you get overfishing, which is bad (and suggests you do not want an open access HS). But complete privatization will only solve that problem (in theory) if fish don’t move (which suggests you don’t want complete privatization). It turns out that MPAs can mitigate both problems, under certain circumstances.”

“I remember two important events from the MLPA process that are relevant for this,” Costello continues. “First, I remember that our model showed that MPAs were really only valuable for fisheries when stocks were heavily overfished. Second, I remember Carl Walters famously arguing in one of the MLPA meetings that if stocks were overfished, and the idea was to use MPAs to help solve the problem, the MPAs would have to be very large much larger than those being considered by the state of CA at that time.”

Costello thinks it would be interesting to consider using “the “threat” of an MPA to get countries to cooperate on governance on the HS. Something like: If RFMOs can sufficiently organize countries so stocks are well-managed, then no MPA will be implemented. But if they cannot, then an MPA might be a useful threat point with other positive benefits.”

Ernesto Penas-Lado sees some issues with using the “threat” of implementing an MPA to motivate countries to cooperate. “White & Costello’s claim that a ban on HG fishing would “induce cooperation among countries” goes against all the evidence I have gathered over >20 years. Cooperation is best brought about by organizations dealing with HS fishing. Where these are not operational (i.e. CECAF in NW Africa) there is no cooperation among coastal states. My experience shows that coastal states are extremely zealous in preserving their independence within their EEZs, if possible to the detriment of their neighbors. Only multilateral cooperation (often imposed by developed countries onto developing ones, even if this sounds politically incorrect) does in fact promote cooperation. In Africa the only cooperation among coastal States was brought by the multilateral bodies established, not by coastal states themselves, who only rivalled in fishing more or attracting more foreign investment.”

“Multilateral cooperation is paramount, especially for highly migratory fish,” Penas-Lado continues. “There I disagree with your conclusions with John Siebert: even if there are local populations of skipjack, these do not coincide with EEZs, so you still need agreements among states, and not just on data collection and science, but crucially on allocation of fishing rights. Lack of multilateral cooperation on skipjack would produce olympic (first come first served) fisheries and would aggravate interceptory fisheries, thus increasing conflict, not cooperation. And on yellowfin tuna, after years dealing with IATTC, I am sure the East Pacific stock would not be better served by the US, Mexico and Ecuador acting as unconstrained coastal states than it has been under IATTC.”

“Enforcement should be a crucial consideration here. Firstly, the intense EU experience fighting IUU (including by European interests) clearly shows that most IUU fishing takes place inside EEZs. Banning fishing in the HS would do nothing to resolve that. On the contrary, it would probably aggravate it: many IUU vessels excluded from the HS would no doubt redeploy within EEZs, and our evidence shows they will stop at nothing to ensure such access, legally or illegally. I have seen myself the level of mismanagement and corruption of many coastal states.”

“Further in enforcement, if fishing in the HS is banned, who will enforce it? The countries that contribute to HS enforcement do so because they fish there. They have an obligation to do it under UNCLOS and they have a vested interest to ensure a level playing field. You remove the fishery and you remove the motivation to control the HS.”

“Legally, who will have to abide by the ban? International fisheries law is not ratified by everyone (the US has not ratified UNCLOS, and many countries have not ratified UNFSA). If you can opt out of such agreement, those that will not sign it could take the place of those withdrawing from the HS. After dealing a lot with certain countries around the world on the IUU file, I am certain that the ban would be ignored by at least a few. Are we going to tell our fishermen to withdraw from the HS only for some opportunistic countries/fleets to occupy their place?”